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ERA OF BACKLASH
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ABSTRACT
This Article brings the lens of civil cases seeking accountability
for gender violence to the question of how international human
rights decisions interpret gender and gender norms. It argues that
a broad interpretation of gender is particularly critical as we face
increasing backlash globally. It demonstrates how international
human rights decisions assessing state responses to gender violence
recognize the role of historic gender biases and stereotypes in holding
states to account for redressing discriminatory responses to abuse,
and considers structural limitations in those instruments that could
impede those instruments’ transformative reach.
INTRODUCTION
I. GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF BACKLASH AND REFORM
II. TENSIONS AND TRANSFORMATION
III. REDRESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR GENDER VIOLENCE AS
DISCRIMINATION
A. European Convention Domestic Violence Decisions
1. Discrimination Claims
2. Other Claims
B. CEDAW Domestic Violence Decisions
1. Law Enforcement Responses and Discrimination
2. Custody, Domestic Violence, and Gender
Discrimination
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INTRODUCTION
This Article contributes to a symposium that critically examines
systematic persecutions attacking women and lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons globally for conduct
deemed to transgress traditional gender roles. It responds to rising
violent attacks and troubling evidence of backlash where progress
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had been noted.1 Advocates have called for the International Criminal
Court to undertake a preliminary examination into gender-based
persecution committed by ISIS as a step toward ending impunity for
sexual- and gender-based crimes.2 At the same time that some advo-
cates press for criminal prosecution of gender-based persecution, a
developing body of case law addresses civil liability aimed at enhanc-
ing state accountability for gender-based crimes and official responses
to them.3
This Article will review a sampling of international human rights
decisions from the European Court of Human Rights and the CEDAW
Committee interpreting gender equality and gender norms in cases
seeking accountability for gender violence.4 Those cases demonstrate
1. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS & GENDER JUSTICE CLINIC (HRGJ) OF CUNY SCHOOL OF
LAW, MADRE & THE ORGANIZATION OF WOMEN’S FREEDOM IN IRAQ (OWFI), COMMUNI-
CATION TO ICC PROSECUTOR PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 15 OF THE ROME STATUTE REQUESTING
A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION INTO THE SITUATION OF: GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION AND
TORTURE AS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE ISLAMIC
STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL) IN IRAQ 1, 8 (2017), https://www.madre.org/sites
/default/f iles/PDFs/CUNY%20MADRE%20OWFI%20Article%2015%20Communication
%20Submission%20Gender%20Crimes%20in%20Iraq%20PDF.pdf [http://perma.cc
/9S4X-4BR2] [hereinafter ICC COMMUNICATION]; INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR, POLICY PAPER ON SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED CRIMES ¶¶ 1, 3 (2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-Based-Crimes-
June-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q5BL-HE3B]; Lisa Davis, Iraqi Women Confronting ISIL:
Protecting Women’s Rights in the Context of Conflict, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 27, 29 (2016).
2. See ICC COMMUNICATION, supra note 1, at 2–3.
3. For discussion of some of those cases, see, e.g., infra Part III. For a discussion of
developments in the Inter-American system, see, e.g., Caroline Bettinger-López, Violence
against Women Normative Developments in the Inter-American Human Rights System,
in THE NORMATIVE GAPS IN THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF WOMEN AND GIRLS FROM
VIOLENCE: PUSHING THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Rashida Manjoo & Jackie
Jones, eds.) (forthcoming April 2018). For additional sources, see, e.g., infra note 4.
4. This review does not purport to be comprehensive but rather analyzes decisions
that illustrate prevailing approaches. It reviews decisions interpreting the European
Convention on Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 32, June 1, 2010, Rome, 4.XI.1950, https://www.echr.coe.int
/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/TTP5-V7WG] [hereinafter European
Convention], and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, art. 2, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (Dec. 18, 1979), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Profes
sionalInterest/cedaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9BF-7SXH] [hereinafter CEDAW], two
treaties that, as discussed in infra Part III, provide redress for gender violence as a form
of discrimination. With that limitation, it does not review the emerging case law under
other international human rights instruments prohibiting gender violence, such as the
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence
Against Women (the “Convention of Belém do Pará”), and other documents that govern
the Inter-American system or other regional treaties, such as the Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the rights of Women in Africa, which also
contain commitments to gender equality and the prohibition of gender violence. See gen-
erally Sally Goldfarb & Julie Goldscheid, International Human Rights Law on Violence
Against Women and Children and Its Impact on Domestic Law and Action, in WOMEN
AND CHILDREN AS VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS: BACKGROUND, PREVENTION, REINTEGRATION
(Helmut Kury, S³awomir Redo & Evelyn Shea eds., 2016), https://link.springer.com/con
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that human rights instruments’ commitments to ending gender
stereotypes are promising and hold potential to address underlying
biases that perpetuate structural inequalities. At the same time, those
instruments’ gender-specific framings may prove limiting when con-
sidering a broader spectrum of gender-based violence.
I. GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF BACKLASH AND REFORM
As others have detailed, the rise of extremism globally has fueled
violence against women and gender nonconforming people. Sexual
violence and rape are increasingly recognized as weapons of war and
conflict.5 Advocates have documented rises, for example, in gender-
based persecutions and impunity for honor crimes.6 They have
documented sexual enslavement, shootings, beheadings, stonings,
and burning of men, women, and youth, including those perceived as
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer for defying
rigid gender norms.7 Distressing reports of police rounding up,
beating, and humiliating dozens of gay or bisexual men in Chechnya
have been met with global outrage but continue nonetheless.8
tent/pdf/bfm%3A978-3-319-08398-8%2F1.pdf [http://perma.cc/JG97-U8Q8]; U.N. DEP’T
OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, DIV. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, HANDBOOK FOR LEGIS-
LATION ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 5–8 (2010), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw
/vaw/handbook/Handbook%20for%20legislation%20on%20violence%20against%20women
.pdf [http://perma.cc/L298-ML7Z] [hereinafter U.N. HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATION]; see, e.g.,
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BASIC DOCUMENTS IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/basic_documents.asp [https://
perma.cc/ZNP2-DE7G]; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
on the Rights of Women in Africa, July 11, 2013, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6, available at
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol [https://perma.cc/L9QW-FCZK].
5. See, e.g., U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM., RAPE: WEAPON OF
WAR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/RapeWeaponWar.aspx [https://perma
.cc/TM43-V7VE]; Sexual violence as a weapon of war, UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org
/sowc96pk/sexviol.htm [https://perma.cc/23QA-82EF]; AMNESTY INT’L, LIVES BLOWN APART:
CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN IN TIMES OF CONFLICT: STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (2004),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ACT77/075/2004/en [https://perma.cc/H5CV-
X8N5]; Women’s Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/topic/womens-rights
[https://perma.cc/W6HK-AT3K] (reporting on global initiatives).
6. See, e.g., ICC COMMUNICATION, supra note 1, at 75; Yifat Susskind, What will it
take to stop Isis using rape as a weapon of war?, ORG. OF WOMEN’S FREEDOM IN IRAQ
(OWFI) (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.owfi.info/EN/article/what-will-it-take-to-stop-isis-using
-rape-as-a-weapon-of-war [https://perma.cc/X7E5-5Z6B].
7. See ICC COMMUNICATION, supra note 1, at 18, 29; SORENSEN CTR. FOR INT’L PEACE
& JUSTICE ET AL., REPORT ON GENDER AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT EXPERTS
MEETING DECEMBER 15–16 (2016) (on f ile with author); see also, e.g., INTER-AMERICAN
COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AN OVERVIEW OF VIOLENCE AGAINST LGBTI PERSONS: A
REGISTRY DOCUMENTING ACTS OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN JANUARY 1, 2013 AND MARCH 1,
2014 1 (2014), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/lgtbi/docs/Annex-Registry-Violence-LGBTI
.pdf [https://perma.cc/SMF5-RL2P].
8. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “THEY HAVE LONG ARMS AND THEY CAN FIND ME”: ANTI-
GAY PURGE BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN RUSSIA’S CHECHEN REPUBLIC 1 (2017), https://www
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Some argue that this rise in sexual violence and enforcement of
traditional gender roles and norms is linked with the rise of extrem-
ist groups, isolationism, and nationalism. For example, commenta-
tors maintain that extremists manipulate gender norms and gender
dynamics to advance their goals, including using sexual violence to
promote bonding among their fighters.9 They argue that extremist
groups justify and promote rape and slavery as recruitment tools.10
Some call for a broad, inclusive understanding of gender in condi-
tions of conflict, where sexual violence is used, across gender lines,
in service of extremist agendas.11
Reports detail legislative and policy initiatives countenancing
and even encouraging rape. For example, a legislative proposal in
Turkey would allow those who sexually abuse girls under the age of
eighteen to go free if they marry their victims.12 President Rodrigo
Duterte of the Philippines reportedly told his soldiers that he would
personally assume responsibility if they rape three women while
enforcing martial law.13 And in the backdrop of the recent wave of
outcry in the United States and Britain over sexual assaults by
powerful men such as Harvey Weinstein,14 many are reminded of
.hrw.org/sites/default/f iles/report_pdf/chechnya0517_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/B92Y-
YNEB].
9. See, e.g., Heather Hurlburt & Jacqueline O’Neill, We need to think harder about
terrorism and gender. ISIS already is., VOX (June 1, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big
-idea/2017/6/1/15722746/terrorism-gender-women-manchester-isis-counterterrorism
[https://perma.cc/6ASF-3J2K] (detailing, inter alia, ways that ISIS profits from human
trafficking and systemic rape, including gang rapes).
10. See, e.g., Sirin Kale, How Terrorist Groups Like ISIS Use Sexual Violence to Lure
Recruits, VICE (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.vice.com/en_id/article/mb7yga/how-terrorist
-groups-like-isis-use-sexual-violence-to-lure-recruits [https://perma.cc/9KYP-ZXVJ] (citing
NIKITA MALIK, HENRY JACKSON SOC’Y, TRAFFICKING TERROR: HOW MODERN SLAVERY AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE FUND TERRORISM (2017), http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/up
loads/2017/10HJS-Traff icking-Terror-Report-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/W83B-73G4]).
11. See, e.g., Rosanne Marrit Anholt, Understanding sexual violence in armed conflict:
cutting ourselves with Occam’s razor, 1 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN ACTION 5 (2016) (“ . . . it
is exactly sexual violence against men that emphasizes the importance of holding on to
the link between women’s subordination and (sexual) violence.”); R. Charli Carpenter,
Recognizing Gender-Based Violence Against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situa-
tions, 37 SECURITY DIALOGUE 83, 86 (2006).
12. Harriet Agerholm, Turkey says child rape pardon law can be amended but refuses
to withdraw proposal, INDEP. (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world
/europe/turkey-akp-child-rape-law-pardon-amended-protest-chp-amended-withdraw-a74
30251.html [https://perma.cc/LVS8-E92J].
13. Mary Papenfuss, Philippines President Duterte Says His Soldiers Can Rape During
Martial Law, HUFFINGTON POST (May 28, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry
/duterte-martial-law-rape_us_592a3abbe4b0065b20b6f179 [http://perma.cc/8A7Y-8KN2].
14. See, e.g., Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey
Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.new
yorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey
-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories [http://perma.cc/KQ9G-UJ2T]; Daniel Victor, How
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President Trump boasting about kissing, groping, and trying to have
sex with women, saying, “when you’re a star, they let you do it.”15
At the same time, a seeming global consensus confirms that
gender violence, including intimate partner violence and sexual as-
sault, violates international human rights norms. Multiple interna-
tional treaties and conventions treat gender violence as a crime,
countering historical impunity.16 International authorities ranging
from the United Nations to the World Health Organization to the
World Bank, have spearheaded campaigns to prevent gender violence
and to support and assist its survivors.17 Increasingly, the “due dili-
gence” standard is invoked as a measure for holding states account-
able for gender violence committed by both state and private actors.18
That standard is generally understood to encompass the state’s duty
to prevent, protect against, prosecute, punish, and provide redress for
the Harvey Weinstein Story Has Unfolded, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/10/18/business/harvey-weinstein.html?mc=aud_dev&mcid=Google-ny
times&mccr=OctoberContent&mcdt=2017-10&subid=OctoberContent&ad-keywords
=AudDevGate&gclid=Cj0KCQjwybvPBRDBARIsAA7T2khaPeZnss5vfkBUBtGab
NaoT12dijvw24SioDkaXJ9pH-x_4uNkOgsaAsjKEALw_wcB&_r=0 [https://perma.cc
/9UVA-KBMY] (linking to related coverage).
15. David A. Fahrenthold, Trump recorded having extremely lewd conversation about
women in 2005, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/trump-recorded-having-extremely-lewd-conversation-about-women-in-2005/2016/10/07
/3b9ce776-8cb4-11e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html?postshare=2491475870527101&tid
=ss_tw&utm_term=.e59465966528 [https://perma.cc/9FA8-N6XP]. See also, e.g., Omar
Burgess, President Trump Was Quietly Subpoenaed for 2007 Sexual Assault Allegation
(Oct. 15, 2017), http://www.complex.com/life/2017/10/trump-subpoenaed-for-2007-allega
tions [https://perma.cc/Z3E5-YPQY]; Nicholas Hautman & Evan Real, These Are the
Women Who’ve Accused Donald Trump of Sexual Misconduct Over the Past 30 Years—
and How He Responded, US WEEKLY (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.usmagazine.com/celeb
rity-news/news/the-women-whove-accused-donald-trump-of-sexual-miscon duct-w444770
[https://perma.cc/LV75-6DS9].
16. See generally supra note 4.
17. See, e.g., U.N. HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATION, supra note 4, at 28–29; Facts and
figures: Ending violence against women, U.N. WOMEN, http://www.unwomen.org/en/what
-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-figures [https://perma.cc/A3CS-8UWU];
Violence against women, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Nov. 2017), http://www.who.int/media
centre/factsheets/fs239/en [https://perma.cc/F5HV-5R7E]; Violence Against Women and
Girls, WORLD BANK (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialdevelopment
/brief/violence-against-women-and-girls [https://perma.cc/ZM5Q-94XS].
18. See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Gen. Rec-
ommendation No. 35, ¶ 24b, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/35 (2017) [hereinafter CEDAW Gen.
Rec. 35] (describing state responsibilities to respond to gender violence with “due dili-
gence”); Yakin Ertürk (Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences), Integration of the Human Rights of Women and a Gender Perspective: Vio-
lence Against Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61/Add.4 (Jan. 13, 2006); Due Diligence
Framework, DUE DILIGENCE PROJECT, http://www.duediligenceproject.org/about.html
[https://perma.cc/DN9N-CZ8G] (detailing contours of the due diligence obligation and
providing resources for implementation); Julie Goldscheid & Debra J. Liebowitz, Due
Diligence and Gender Violence: Parsing its Power and its Perils, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
301, 301 (2015).
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acts of gender violence.19 Reports detail states’ obligations to ensure
formal sanctions against gender violence, to develop and implement
programs and services advancing primary and secondary prevention,
and to provide redress for survivors.20 Yet, as the above examples
suggest and as a body of advocacy and reporting detail, much work
remains to advance universal compliance with seemingly basic
goals, such as including gender violence among the crimes proscribed
by criminal law, providing adequate services to survivors, and estab-
lishing meaningful and effective prevention programs.21
The trajectory of backlash and bias-motivated violence calls for
critical inquiry into how existing laws can and should be interpreted
to hold states accountable. Of course, law is only one tool in the
range of strategies needed to end gender and other forms of bias-
motivated violence.22 Nevertheless, laws and commentary detailing
the links between gender violence, historic gender discrimination,
the pernicious nature of bias, and the insidious ways bias manifests
should be invoked to shape interpretations that go as far as the law
can to advance peace, safety, and equality.
II. TENSIONS AND TRANSFORMATION
Not surprisingly, multiple questions animate debates about the
promises and limits of strategies to advancing the laudable goal of
state accountability for gender violence. International human rights
instruments’ focus on prevention and their framing of gender violence
as an equality problem grounded in historic gender stereotypes and
gender norms hold promise to meaningfully advance the goals of
19. See supra note 18 (citing sources).
20. For one recent example, see, e.g., U.N. Secretariat (Special Rapporteur on violence
against women, its causes and consequences), ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/30 (June 2,
2017) (documenting key elements of a human rights–based approach to integrated
services and protection programs with a focus on shelters and protection orders). For
additional reports, see, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, http://www.ohchr.org
/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/CEDAWIndex.aspx [https://perma.cc/QH4L-3YYR] (col-
lecting, inter alia, Special Rapporteur and country reports).
21. I include criminal law in this list of needed reforms in acknowledgment of the
calls for criminalization from advocates in jurisdictions in which gender violence is
excluded from the universe of crimes subject to state sanction, notwithstanding the
myriad of ways the criminal justice responses to gender violence in the United States
and elsewhere have proved problematic and even harmful to the survivors they purport
to vindicate. See, e.g., Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 18, at 317.
22. See, e.g., Ratna Kapur, Gender, Sovereignty and the Rise of A Sexual Security
Regime in International Law and Postcolonial India, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 317, 340–41
(2013) (critiquing centrality of the state in responses to gender violence and arguing that
the stability of gender and binary gender categories is maintained in part through the
focus on sexual violence against women).
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preventing and even eliminating gender violence.23 As Part III
demonstrates, that framing of gender violence as a form of discrimi-
nation provides a powerful foundation for surfacing and challenging
the nuanced ways gender biases and stereotypes infuse both the
commission of gender violence and the response of authorities at all
points of contact. Yet, implementation efforts risk prioritizing and
privileging criminal justice reforms over the challenging work of
rooting out historic biases and discrimination.24 In addition, tensions
inherent in those and related instruments reflect structural limita-
tions that may constrain an instrument’s transformative reach. In
particular, the gender-specific framing of many interventions as
targeting “violence against women,” in tandem with the focus on
“protection,” could prove to limit those instruments’ abilities to re-
dress gender violence committed against LGBTI and gender noncon-
forming survivors.25
A number of human rights instruments name and treat gender
violence as a form of discrimination against women, marking signifi-
cant and hard-fought advocacy victories. The equation of gender
violence with gender discrimination is laudable, while, as discussed
below, the gender-specific focus on “women” may prove limiting. A
close look at the instruments’ language illustrates this tension. The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women’s (CEDAW) General Recommendation No. 19 explicitly
defines “gender-based violence” as a form of discrimination.26 It
describes gender violence as a “form of discrimination that seriously
inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of
equality with men.” 27 It critiques previous reports that failed ade-
quately to reflect the “close connection between discrimination against
women, gender-based violence, and violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms.” 28 The General Recommendation stresses
the importance of challenging outdated stereotypes and bias.29 It
critiques traditional attitudes regarding women as subordinate to
23. See Julie Goldscheid, Domestic and Sexual Violence as Sex Discrimination:
Comparing American and International Approaches, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 355,
378–84 (2005).
24. See id. at 388–92; see also, e.g., Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 18, at 311–17.
25. See, e.g., Julie Goldscheid, Gender Neutrality, The “Violence Against Women”
Frame, and Transformative Reform, 82 UMKC L. REV. 623, 636–46 (2014).
26. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Gen. Recommenda-
tion No. 19, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/41/45 (1992) [hereinafter CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19]. See also
CEDAW Gen. Rec. 35, supra note 18 (reaffirming and elaborating on links between
gender violence and gender discrimination).
27. Id.
28. Id. ¶ 4.
29. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
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men and stereotyped roles that are invoked to justify gender vio-
lence, sometimes in the form of “protection or control.” 30 It calls on
states to identify and take “effective measures” to overcome these
attitudes, customs, and practices and to eliminate prejudices that
hinder women’s equality.31
Similarly, the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (the
“Istanbul Convention”) explicitly situates “violence against women”
and “domestic violence” as problems of discrimination.32 The Pream-
ble recognizes “that violence against women is a manifestation of
historically unequal power relations between women and men,” and
that the “structural nature” of violence against women is “gender-
based violence,” which is one of the crucial social mechanisms that
enforce women’s subordination relative to men.33 One of its stated
purposes is to “contribute to the elimination of all forms of discrimi-
nation against women and promote substantive equality between
women and men, including by empowering women.” 34 Notwith-
standing the focus on “women,” it explicitly recognizes that men
may also be victims, and it recognizes the harms of intersectional
discrimination, requiring that the treaty’s implementation, particu-
larly with respect to victims:
[S]hall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as
sex, gender, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, state of
health, disability, marital status, migrant or refugee status, or
other status.35
It makes explicit that “special measures” necessary to “prevent and
protect” women from gender-based violence should not be considered
discrimination under the Convention, opening the door to remedial
measures that advance substantive equality.36 As discussed below,
30. Id. ¶ 11.
31. Id. ¶¶ 24(e–f).
32. Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women
and domestic violence art. 3, May 11, 2011, V.2011, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conven
tions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/090000168008482e [https://perma.cc/QF23-JBZM] [here-
inafter Istanbul Convention]. For a description of the ways in which the Istanbul Conven-
tion was built on CEDAW’s anti-discrimination framework, see, e.g., Council of Europe
Secretariat, The Istanbul Convention and the CEDAW framework: A comparison of
measures to prevent and combat violence against women (working paper prepared for
reference purposes only), https://rm.coe.int/168059aa28 [https://perma.cc/H486-FSM5].
33. Istanbul Convention, supra note 32, at preamble.
34. Id. at art. 1.1(b).
35. Id. at art. 4.3.
36. Id. at art. 4.4.
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decisions interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights,
which contains an enforcement mechanism and which prohibits
discrimination based, among other things, on “sex, race, colour, lan-
guage, [and] religion,” have begun to reference the Istanbul Conven-
tion in claims asserting that state responses to gender violence
discriminated against victims and survivors.37
Yet at the same time that CEDAW and the Istanbul Convention
explicitly acknowledge the harms of gender stereotypes and the ways
they manifest in gender violence, those treaties are framed primarily
in terms of discrimination against “women” and reflect and incorpo-
rate the gender-specific frame, “violence against women.” 38 No doubt
the question whether anti-violence initiatives should be framed in
gender-neutral or gender-specific terms is the subject of longstanding
and hotly contested debate.39 Yet recent examples of backlash against
women, LGBTI individuals, and other gender nonconforming people
suggest we should urge a gender-neutral frame that enables critique
of a broad range of gender stereotypes to fall within its frame.
Although many support the gender-specific frame as a way of
calling attention to the disproportionate impact of gender violence
on women, and of its roots in patriarchal values and beliefs,40 it can
serve as a barrier to transformational reform. It can produce “awk-
ward practical contradictions,” for example, touting programs ad-
dressing “violence against women” that nevertheless serve men as
well.41 The focus on “women” operates to exclude survivors from mar-
ginalized groups who may identify more with other aspects of their
identities than with their identities as women.42 It fuels legal chal-
lenges by men who claim to be excluded and therefore aggrieved by
the gender-specific frame.43 It produces practical challenges in that
gay and transgender men may be excluded from needed services.44
It may expose survivors to increased risk, for example, by assuming
that a female visitor to a woman in a domestic violence shelter is a
friend and not an abuser.45 Moreover, by equating the identity of
“woman” with “victim,” it may serve to enshrine rather than challenge
traditional gender stereotypes.46
37. See European Convention, supra note 4; see infra Part III (discussing cases).
38. See Goldscheid, supra note 25, at 628–29.
39. Id. at 628–46.
40. Id. at 628–30.
41. Id. at 626.
42. Id. at 637–40.
43. Id. at 641–44.
44. Goldscheid, supra note 25, at 645–46.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 640–41.
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The gender-specific frame may fuel protective representations
that, as Diane Otto persuasively has argued, inscribe women’s vulner-
abilities and deny women agency and autonomy.47 This protective
lens, reflected explicitly in the due diligence directive to “protect”
and codified in other human rights instruments,48 may reinforce a
gender-specific trope casting “women” as passive victims and fueling
traditional stereotypes that run counter to the anti-stereotyping
goal of challenging traditional gender roles and celebrating women’s
autonomy.49 As many of the CEDAW and European Court of Human
Rights decisions, discussed in more detail below, illustrate, these
instruments recognize multiple forms of societal subordination and
hold states to account.50 But those accounts, which often rest on
narratives of a woman’s vulnerability, stand in sharp contrast to the
lives of survivors, who exercise courage, strength, and agency daily.
That protectionist frame may, even inadvertently, fail to promote,
and may even impede, intersectional, progressive strategies for
reform.
Neither CEDAW’s General Recommendation No. 19 nor the
Istanbul Convention are entirely clear with respect to how they would
be applied to violence committed against LGBTI people. Both define
gender-based violence as “violence that is directed against a woman
because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately,”51
while the Istanbul Convention recognizes in its Preamble that
“domestic violence affects women disproportionately and that men
may also be victims of domestic violence.” 52 Both titles reflect the
gender-specific “woman”-centered frame, although the Istanbul Con-
vention’s title, which includes “domestic violence” as well as “violence
against women,” seemingly encompasses gender violence (at least
47. Id. (citing Diane Otto, International Human Rights Law: Towards Rethinking
Sex/Gender Dualism, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY
(Margaret Davies & Vanessa E. Munro eds., 2013) (critiquing asymmetrical approaches
to sex/gender distinctions). See also, e.g., Jamie R. Abrams, The Feminist Case for Acknowl-
edging Women’s Acts of Violence, 27 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 287, 316 (2016) (critiquing
stereotypes of survivors as weak and dependent).
48. See, e.g., Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 18, at 320–22; see also infra Part III
(discussing cases, including, for example, Bãlºan v. Romania, App. No. 49645/09, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 21 (2017), which draw on that protective frame).
49. See, e.g., LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM 141 (2011) (urging focus on survivors’ autonomy); see also Linda L. Ammons,
Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-
American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 1003, 1015–16
(1995); Zanita Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereo-
types in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 21 (1998).
50. See infra notes 58–61; see also infra Part III (discussing cases).
51. CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19, supra note 26, ¶ 6; Istanbul Convention, supra note 32, at
art. 3(d).
52. Istanbul Convention, supra note 32, at preamble.
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domestic violence) committed against those who do not identify as
women.53 Of course, courts could interpret both those instruments in
a manner similar to that employed by the United States Department
of Justice, which, under the United States’ Violence Against Women
Act, supported programs and services addressing “violence against
women” while reassuring that those programs are available to men.54
Notably, as cases discussed in Part III illustrate, the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, which generally prohibits discrimination
based, inter alia, on “sex,” and which, inter alia, protects the right to
life (Article 2), prohibits torture (Article 3), and the right to respect
for private and family life (Article 8), but which does not invoke the
gender specific “violence against women” frame, may prove to have a
broader, and more inclusive, reach than the gender violence–specific
instruments, at least with respect to LGBTI people.55
Absent clarity about their reach, these gender-specific approaches
could be interpreted to exclude men, including transgender and gay
men, who may well be harmed by the very gender stereotypes that
inform gender violence committed against women.56 Indeed, in the
United States, courts have been split over whether anti-discrimina-
tion laws, which prohibit, among other things, discrimination based
on “sex,” would apply to discrimination against LGBTI people.57
53. Id. In addition, the Istanbul Convention’s anti-discrimination provision explicitly
prohibits discrimination based, inter alia, on sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity.
See id. at art. 4.3.
54. See, e.g., What is Domestic Violence?, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN (last updated June 16, 2017), http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence
.htm [https://perma.cc/CE94-ME3Q] (acknowledging that domestic violence occurs in
both opposite-sex and same-sex relationships); Frequently Asked Questions, April 9,
2014, Nondiscrimination Grant Condition in the Violence Against Women Reauthori-
zation Act of 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/f iles/ovw/legacy/2014/06/20/faqs-ngc
-vawa.pdf [https://perma.cc/DYQ7-XDFX] (making clear that programs funded under
VAWA may not discriminate based, inter alia, on sex, gender identity or sexual orien-
tation, with limited exceptions allowing sex-specif ic programming where “necessary to
the essential operation of a program,” and then, when “comparable services” are provided
to individuals who would not be served by the sex-segregated or sex-specific programming).
55. See European Convention, supra note 4.
56. See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 25, at 634–35 nn.60–62 (reviewing studies of
prevalence of intimate partner violence in LGBT relationships); see also id. at 636–38
(discussing queer and gender theorists’ resistance to the gender-specif ic frame).
57. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., YALE L. & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER NO.
582, TITLE VII’S STATUTORY HISTORY AND THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT FOR
LGBTI WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS (2017); KATIE R. EYER, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y: FOR
LAW & POLICY, SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LGBT EQUALITY (2017); Brief of NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. and the Asian American Legal Defense and
Education Fund as Amici Curiae in support of Respondent, Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v.
G.G., 136 S. Ct. 2442 (2016) (No. 16-273) (detailing role of race and gender-based
stereotypes in anti-LGBTI prohibitions).
570 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW           [  V    o l. 24:559
At the same time, both CEDAW and the Istanbul Convention
recognize the role of intersectional discrimination in informing how
multiple forms of structural subordination impact violence and abuse.
CEDAW’s General Recommendations Nos. 28 and 35 explicitly in-
corporate socially constructed discrimination based on gender as part
of the Convention’s prohibition of discrimination against women.58
Those Recommendations similarly acknowledge intersectional dis-
crimination and that discrimination against “women based on sex
and gender” is linked to other factors, including race, ethnicity, reli-
gion, and sexual orientation.59 Likewise, CEDAW’s General Recom-
mendation No. 33 on women’s access to justice opens the door to
recognizing multiple social and cultural barriers.60 It recognizes that
“intersectional or compounded discrimination may include ethnic-
ity/race, indigenous or minority status, colour, socio-economic status
and/or caste, language, religion or belief, political opinion, national
origin, marital and/or maternal status, age, urban/rural location,
health status, disability, property ownership, and being lesbian,
bisexual, transgender women or intersex persons.” 61 While these
definitions are laudable in explicitly recognizing intersectional
discrimination, they seem categorically to exclude men, including
gay men, who are omitted from the language of the recommendations.
Taking a more inclusive approach, the Istanbul Convention provides
that implementation “shall be secured without discrimination on
any ground such as . . . sexual orientation, gender identity . . . .” 62
Overall, these instruments offer a rich, if complex, foundation from
which the CEDAW Committee and European Court of Human Rights,
which adjudicate complaints brought under CEDAW’s Optional
Protocol, and the European Convention, respectively, can recognize
and provide redress for the impact of gender norms and intersec-
tional discrimination on gender violence.
III. REDRESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR GENDER
VIOLENCE AS DISCRIMINATION
International human rights instruments’ promises of redress
and accountability for gender violence hold the potential to provide
58. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Gen. Recommenda-
tion No. 28, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28 (2010) [hereinafter CEDAW Gen. Rec. 28];
CEDAW Gen. Rec. 35, supra note 18, ¶ 12.
59. CEDAW Gen. Rec. 28, supra note 58, ¶¶ 5, 18, 19; CEDAW Gen. Rec. 35, supra
note 18, ¶ 12.
60. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Gen. Recommendation
No. 33, ¶¶ 3, 7, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/3 (2015) (recognizing compounded discrimination
and socially constructed gender identities, respectively).
61. Id. ¶ 8.
62. Istanbul Convention, supra note 32, at art. 4.3.
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remedies for gender violence itself and for institutional responses
that compound discriminatory harms. This section reviews decisions
under the European Convention on Human Rights63 and the Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women64 in which survivors have sought state accountability for
failed and discriminatory responses to gender violence. It reviews
three categories of decisions: cases seeking state accountability for
failed law enforcement responses to requests by gender violence sur-
vivors (typically, intimate partner violence in heterosexual relation-
ships) for assistance; cases involving custody determinations where
domestic violence is a factor; and cases seeking state accountability
for violence based on gender identity. As this Part demonstrates,
many of these decisions explicitly recognize and challenge the roles
and impacts of gender discrimination and gender-based stereotypes
both in perpetuating gender violence and in institutional responses
to it. They offer valuable examples of how human rights instruments’
expressed and intended purposes of condemning discrimination and
holding states to account for meaningful responses can be applied
to facts on the ground. But the gender-specific framing of “violence
against women” that is reflected in CEDAW and in the Istanbul
Convention may well limit the transformative reach of that other-
wise progressive frame.
A number of cases, decided both under the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and by the CEDAW Committee, recognize
state accountability for gender violence, both as a form of discrimi-
nation and as a violation of other treaty provisions. A number of the
decisions under both of these instruments carefully parse the role
and manifestation of gender bias and stereotypes and can serve as
a model for how human rights instruments’ expressed purposes of
condemning bias in all its forms may be interpreted.
A. European Convention Domestic Violence Decisions
Decisions by the European Court of Human Rights holding states
accountable for meaningfully responding when gender violence sur-
vivors call for assistance draw on the European Convention’s ex-
plicit anti-discrimination prohibition, as well as on the Convention’s
63. Article 34 of the European Convention provides for applications by individuals
claiming violations of the Convention. European Convention, supra note 4, at art. 34.
64. CEDAW’s Optional Protocol provides a Communications Procedure that allows
either individuals or groups of individuals to submit individual complaints to the
CEDAW Committee. G.A. Res. 54/4, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, at art. 4 (Oct. 15, 1999).
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other human rights provisions.65 This section will first discuss cases
seeking state accountability for gender violence that claim violations
of the Convention’s anti-discrimination provision, and then will review
additional decisions that reflect the Court’s analysis of the nuances
of abuse even where charges of discrimination are not brought.66
1. Discrimination Claims
A series of cases brought by survivors of gender violence and their
families assert that law enforcement’s responses violate the European
Convention’s anti-discrimination prohibition.67 In many of these
cases, the European Court of Human Rights easily concluded that
states’ failed responses amounted to impermissible gender dis-
rimination, with little searching analysis. For example, in Bãlºan
v. Romania, the European Court of Human Rights found that the
violence suffered by the plaintiff at the hands of her husband
throughout their marriage “[could] be regarded as gender-based
violence, which is a form of discrimination against women.” 68 The
Court recognized the pernicious role of stereotypes when it reasoned
that it was “concerning” that the national authorities, in responding
to the plaintiff’s requests for help after assaults intensified during
divorce proceedings, had done little to stop or to prevent assaults
from happening again; instead, the authorities considered the acts
of abuse as “being provoked and . . . as not being serious enough to
fall within the scope of the criminal law.” 69 In unanimously finding
a violation of the Convention’s anti-discrimination prohibition
(Article 14), the Court concluded that the State’s failure to protect
women violated their rights to equal protection.70 The decision
detailed Romania’s official statistics showing that domestic violence
was tolerated, and even “perceived as normal,” and that the number
of victims increased every year with the majority being women.71 It
took the national authorities to task for being aware of the history
65. See European Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 2–3, 14.
66. For a summary of domestic violence cases, see, e.g., EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2017), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Domestic_violence
_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQC7-PSCK].
67. See European Convention, supra note 4, at art. 14 (providing that “[t]he enjoy-
ment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status.”).
68. Bãlºan v. Romania, App. No. 49645/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 (2017).
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id. at 19, 22.
71. Id. at 7–8.
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of abuse but failing to consider protective measures against the
abuser, despite the plaintiff’s repeated requests to the police, the
prosecutor, and the courts.72 The decision cited both the CEDAW
Committee’s concluding comments with respect to Romania, and the
Istanbul Convention, in concluding that the authorities’ responses
were “inconsistent with international standards . . . .” 73
The decision may well be applauded on a number of grounds. It
explicitly recognized states’ obligations to take abuse seriously and
recognized gender violence in general, and domestic violence in partic-
ular, as a form of gender discrimination.74 Moreover, its critique of
the national authorities’ treatment of the abuse suffered by the com-
plainant as “being provoked” by her abuser acknowledges a classic
stereotype that often thwarts claims by survivors of gender violence.75
But the decision’s focus on the criminal justice system’s re-
sponses as the lens through which to measure state responsiveness
falls short of the full promise of equality reflected in the European
Convention. For example, the Bãlºan v. Romania decision rightly
discusses the State’s failure to respond to the plaintiff’s calls for
intervention and the failure of the criminal law to appropriately or
adequately offer any measure of redress.76 While the decision’s focus
on criminal justice responses is certainly responsive to the nature
of the complaint and may well have been a laudable reaction to the
plaintiff’s apparent call for improved law enforcement responses,
the decision might have advanced broader anti-discrimination goals
by identifying or discussing other ways to challenge the insidious
bias that perpetuates abuse and institutional failures to adequately
assist survivors and redress harm. In addition, the decision frames
the State’s failure as a failure “to protect women” against domestic
violence,77 arguably enshrining the protectionist frame legal schol-
ars have critiqued as in tension with the anti-stereotyping goals of
many international human rights instruments.
Like Bãlºan v. Romania, in Talpis v. Italy, the European Court
of Human Rights found violations of the European Convention in
light of law enforcement’s failed responses to a history of domestic
violence by the plaintiff’s husband, which resulted in the murder of
her son and her own attempted murder.78 A majority of the Court
72. Id. at 19.
73. Id. at 9–10, 17.
74. Bãlºan, App. No. 49645/09 at 14, 21.
75. Id. at 19.
76. Id. at 17, 21.
77. Id. at 21.
78. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, EHCR 075, Italian authorities
failed to protect a mother and son because they did not take prompt action on a complaint
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concluded that police failure to take prompt action in response to
Ms. Talpis’ complaints created “a situation of impunity” conducive
to additional acts of violence, which led to the attempted murder of
Ms. Talpis and the murder of her son.79 Consequently, the Court
found that the authorities “failed in their obligation to protect [Ms.
Talpis and her children]”, and that she had been “the victim of dis-
crimination as a woman” on account of the authorities’ inaction.80
Further, the Court concluded that the authorities’ inaction underes-
timated the violence and “essentially endorsed it.” 81
The decision detailed a history of abuse and of Ms. Talpis’
repeated complaints to law enforcement with little or minimal
response.82 For example, after one incident, the officers fined her
husband for carrying a prohibited weapon and then invited Ms.
Talpis to go home.83 After a call during which law enforcement found
that her husband committed bodily harm, the police closed the
complaint file.84 The final incident followed a call by Ms. Talpis to
the police after which her husband was taken to a hospital in a state
of intoxication and then was discharged.85 He subsequently entered
the family apartment with a kitchen knife, stabbed Ms. Talpis in
the chest as she was trying to escape, and stabbed their son, who
subsequently died of his injuries.86 The husband was sentenced to
life imprisonment for murder and attempted murder and was or-
dered to pay Ms. Talpis damages.87
The Court found that the domestic authorities’ failure to issue
any kind of protection order, and their delay in questioning Ms.
Talpis, deprived her of the immediate protection she needed.88 It
found a violation of the right to life (Article 2) and of the prohibition
of inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3).89 It also concluded
that the State’s “failure to protect women against domestic violence”
violated their right to equal protection and the Convention’s prohibi-
tion of discrimination (Article 14), and that by failing to take action
concerning conjugal violence (Feb. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Talpis Press Release], available
at http://www.giurisprudenzapenale.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Scarica-il-comu
nicato-stampa-della-Corte-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/B42R-H7WX].
79. Id. (stating that two judges dissented from this f inding).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Talpis Press Release, supra note 78.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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following repeated requests for intervention, the State “essentially
endorsed” the violence.90 The Court acknowledged the “undisputed
statistical data” showing the disproportionate impact of domestic
violence on women, and “that the socio-cultural attitudes of toler-
ance of domestic violence were alive and well.” 91 It easily concluded
that the violence inflicted against Ms. Talpis “should be considered
as being grounded on sex and that it consequently amounted to a
form of discrimination against women” given the statistics demon-
strating that domestic violence victims are primarily women, and
that domestic violence persisted despite reforms.92 Thus, like Bãlºan
v. Romania, the Court’s recognition of domestic violence as discrimi-
nation marks a notable step forward in formally acknowledging the
discriminatory nature of intimate partner violence and the biased
response survivors often receive from authorities. On the other hand,
the decision does not offer much more than a somewhat conclusory
statement about how courts should analyze discrimination in these
contexts. Also like Bãlºan v. Romania, it incorporates the protec-
tionist frame that serves to promote state accountability but also
stands in tension with the directive to combat gender stereotypes.
In Kilic v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights em-
ployed a similar analysis in finding that state responses violated the
Convention’s prohibition of discrimination.93 There, the applicant’s
husband killed their daughter after the applicant complained to the
authorities four times, stating that she feared for her and her chil-
dren’s lives and asked for intervention.94 She had obtained three
protection orders and injunctions, but the authorities failed to punish
the husband’s failure to comply with the orders issued against him
and created a “context of impunity” enabling him to repeatedly assault
his wife without being called to account.95 By leaving her without
resources or protection in light of her husband’s violent behavior,
the authorities “created a climate that was conducive to domestic
violence.” 96 The Court noted that it took nineteen days for one of the
protection orders, and eight weeks for the second, to be served.97 The
police did not assess the risk to the applicant’s daughter when
90. Talpis Press Release, supra note 78.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, ECHR 227, Turkish authorities
did not effectively protect the life of a woman threatened with death by her husband
(June 28, 2016) [hereinafter Kilic Press Release].
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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considering his punishment after he was arrested, and no penalties
were assessed for his failure to comply with the injunctions that had
been issued.98 The Court noted the authorities’ failure to help her
find appropriate shelter, and that they had failed to take into ac-
count her vulnerable psychological, physical, and material situa-
tions, and offer her appropriate support.99 Given these failures, the
Court found a violation of the prohibition of discrimination, along
with a violation of the right to life.100 It highlighted the authorities’
failure to provide her with protection, and by contrast, noted that
her husband had been afforded impunity.101 By regularly “turning
a blind eye” to repeated violence and death threats, the authorities
created a “climate that was conducive to domestic violence.”102 That
said, here, as in Bãlºan and Talpis, the Court relied on a protection-
ist frame in holding the state to account.
Similarly, in M.G. v. Turkey, the applicant filed a complaint after
leaving her home on account of longstanding domestic violence.103
M.G. had repeatedly sought protective measures from the family court
in response to her former husband’s continual threats of violence
and death.104 The Court found a violation of the Convention’s prohi-
bition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment based, in
part, on the fact that the complaint against him was still pending
more than five and a half years after she had filed it.105 The Court
further found that the State’s failure, “even where unintentional, to
protect women against domestic violence breached [women’s] right
to equal protection under the law.”106 The Court noted that the
country’s “general and discriminatory judicial passivity . . . creat[ed]
a climate that was conducive to domestic violence.”107 It also noted
that the country had not yet guaranteed divorced women protective
measures against their former spouses and found a violation of the
prohibition on discrimination taken together with the violation of
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.108 Notably, the Court
98. Id.
99. Kilic Press Release, supra note 93.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, ECHR 101, The authorities’
passivity with regard to a woman’s experience of domestic violence was in breach of
Convention (Mar. 22, 2016) [hereinafter M.G. Press Release], available at https://rm.coe
.int/168062cf75 [https://perma.cc/4F6R-PL35].
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2–3.
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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found it unacceptable that M.G. had been left without resources or
protection, a welcome acknowledgment of the material resources
that are essential to a survivor’s safety, well-being, and autonomy,
albeit with a nod toward the protectionist frame that conjures tradi-
tional notions of male protection of women.109
In a few cases, the European Court of Human Rights closely
examined the role of gender-based stereotypes in informing state
responses. For example, in Opuz v. Turkey, the applicant alleged that
Turkey’s domestic law was discriminatory and insufficiently pro-
tected women.110 It cited international human rights principles,
including those articulated in CEDAW, the United Nations Commis-
sion on Human Rights Resolution 2003/45, the Belém do Pará
Convention, and decisions by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, to conclude that “the State’s failure to protect women
against domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection of
the law and that this failure does not need to be intentional.”111 The
Court concluded that although the State had adopted welcomed
legislative reforms, the “general attitude of local authorities,” such
as the way domestic violence survivors were treated by police and
the “judicial passivity” in providing “protection” reflected discrimi-
nation.112 Similarly, research demonstrating that police officers do
not investigate domestic violence complaints but instead seek to
mediate them, as well as “unreasonable delays in issuing injunctions,”
revealed that the authorities tolerate domestic violence and that
existing remedies are not effective, thus creating a climate that was
discriminatory and conducive to domestic violence.113 The Court
concluded that the “general and discriminatory judicial passivity . . .
albeit unintentional, mainly affected women” and concluded that
the violence suffered by the applicant and her mother was gender
based and a form of discrimination against women.114 It reaffirmed
that “the State’s failure to protect women against domestic violence
breaches their right to equal protection . . . and that this failure
does not need to be intentional.”115
That reasoning opened the door to subsequent claims that
particular practices were discriminatory. So, for example, in Eremia
109. M.G. Press Release, supra note 103.
110. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 178 (2009).
111. Id. ¶¶ 184–91. It further recognized that the Belem do Para Convention describes
every woman’s right to be free from violence as encompassing “the right to be free from
all forms of discrimination.”
112. Id. ¶ 192.
113. Id. ¶¶ 195–98.
114. Id. ¶¶ 200, 202.
115. Id. ¶ 191.
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v. Moldova, the applicant claimed that the State’s response was
discriminatory because she had been subjected to violence on a
number of occasions, the authorities were aware of that history, the
judge refused to act quickly, and no action was taken in response to
her formal complaint.116 In addition, the applicant was allegedly
pressured to withdraw her complaint against her husband, the
police failed to enforce her protection order for over two months, and
they suggested reconciliation because she was “not the first nor the
last woman to be beaten up by her husband.”117 After a detailed
analysis of the authorities’ response, the Court concluded that the
authorities’ actions effectively condoned the violence and reflected
a discriminatory attitude toward the applicant “as a woman.”118
Similarly, in Mudric v. Moldova, the Court found that the State’s
response to a domestic violence survivor, who had been subjected to
repeated violence, reflected a discriminatory attitude toward her “as
a woman.”119 The Court acknowledged that three protection orders
had been issued but were not enforced, that her husband openly
opposed local police and social workers, and that despite legal pro-
visions authorizing criminal proceedings and a psychiatric examina-
tion, the authorities did not take steps to exercise that authority for
almost a year.120 It took into account states’ obligations under CEDAW
to respond to domestic violence with due diligence and concluded
that the authorities’ responses were not “a simple failure or delay”
but instead condoned the abuse and reflected a discriminatory
attitude toward the complainant “as a woman.”121
In a subsequent complaint against Moldova, T.M. and C.M. v.
Moldova, the Court applied a nuanced understanding of the ways
gender bias impacts law enforcement’s responses to domestic vio-
lence.122 As in Mudric, it concluded that the authorities’ responses
to requests for help by a survivor of domestic violence reflected a
discriminatory attitude toward the complainant, who had made
numerous complaints to law enforcement and received slow and, in
her view, inadequate responses.123 The Court noted, among other
things, that the authorities’ assessment that injuries were not suf-
ficiently severe reflected a failure to understand that domestic
violence does not always result in physical injury.124 It took note of
116. Eremia v. Moldova, App. No. 3564/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 86 (2013).
117. Id. ¶ 87.
118. Id. ¶ 89.
119. Mudric v. Moldova, App. No. 74839/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 62, 63 (2013).
120. Id. ¶ 62.
121. Id. ¶ 60, 62, 63.
122. T.M. and C.M. v. Moldova, App. No. 26608/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (2014).
123. Id.
124. Id. ¶ 59.
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the length of time it took for authorities to consider one of the appli-
cations for a protection order, their failure to forward it for enforce-
ment, as well as law enforcement’s failure to remove the abuser
from the home, as indicative of the authorities’ “passivity” in their
failure to consider protective measures.125 It “question[ed] the atti-
tude of the domestic court,” which found no evidence of domestic
violence despite a record before it of verbal and physical abuse and
concluded that the responses “condoned” the violence and “reflected
a discriminatory attitude” toward the complainant “as a woman.”126
Other decisions reflect the Court’s recognition that state re-
sponses could violate the Convention due to their discriminatory
impact. For example, in A. v. Croatia, the complainant claimed, among
other things, that the State’s laws relating to domestic violence were
insufficient and ineffective, and since acts of domestic violence were
predominantly committed against women, those laws were also
discriminatory.127 She had survived repeated abuse by her husband,
who had endured a concentration camp and had been found to suffer
from mental disorders, including PTSD.128 After several criminal
proceedings and ongoing threats and abuse, the applicant and her
husband’s marriage was dissolved.129 She claimed that Croatia’s
domestic violence legislation was discriminatory because it treated
acts of domestic violence, including acts of serious physical abuse,
as minor offenses whereas similar acts that occurred between
strangers were treated as a matter for traditional criminal law
remedies.130 In addition, she argued that two national strategies for
addressing domestic violence had been adopted but not implemented;
in particular, provisions requiring experts to be trained were insuffi-
cient and had not been evaluated.131 Finally, she argued that statis-
tics capturing the results of cases requesting protective measures
and statistics revealing the length of domestic violence proceedings
revealed discriminatory treatment of those cases, since women were
the predominant victims of domestic violence.132
In what could signal a framework for analyzing disparate impact
claims, the Court acknowledged that it would accept arguments of
discriminatory impact even if a discriminatory policy is not specifi-
cally aimed at the impacted group, unless the policy is justified by
125. Id. ¶¶ 59–60.
126. Id. ¶¶ 61–62.
127. A. v. Croatia, App. No. 55164/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 88 (2010).
128. Id. ¶¶ 9–17.
129. Id. ¶ 39.
130. Id. ¶ 89.
131. Id. ¶ 90.
132. Id. ¶¶ 89–92.
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a “legitimate aim” and the means of achieving that aim are “ap-
propriate, necessary and proportionate.”133 The Court here rejected
the applicant’s claim.134 It noted that unlike Opuz, the complainant
here did not provide statistical or other information reflecting dis-
criminatory treatment of women domestic violence victims,135 nor
did the applicant allege that she had been dissuaded from pursu-
ing prosecution or discouraged from seeking protection from her
abuser.136 The Court evaluated whether the arguments presented
prima facie evidence of gender discrimination137 and concluded that
the fact that some allegations of domestic violence may be treated
as “minor offenses” was not itself discriminatory, and that the legis-
lative framework was not discriminatory.138 The Court dismissed the
complainant’s other allegations of discrimination based on its conclu-
sion that even though failure to institute all recommended sanctions
was “problematic,” it didn’t support a conclusion of discrimination
since the complainant had failed to support her allegations about
failed training of experts with examples, data or reports.139
Other decisions have rejected arguments that state responses
were discriminatory after concluding that the state adequately re-
sponded to calls for law enforcement intervention. For example, in
Rumor v. Italy, the Court rejected allegations that Italy had violated
Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention.140 There, the complainant’s
former partner had been detained and arrested following acts of
violence the Court concluded were “sufficiently serious” to violate
the Convention’s prohibitions on “torture” or “inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”141 Nevertheless, the Court concluded
that the authorities’ responses, which included arrest, custody and
criminal charges, and forfeiture of the former partner’s parental
rights, reflected a legislative framework that “was effective in punish-
ing the perpetrator” and preventing recurrent violence.142 The Court
dismissed the petitioner’s complaints, for example, about the location
of the facility where he was detained (which was near where she
133. Croatia, App. No. 55164/08 ¶ 94.
134. Id. ¶¶ 100–104.
135. Id. ¶ 97.
136. Id.
137. Id. ¶ 98.
138. Id. ¶ 100. The Court’s conclusion in this regard was buttressed by its observation
that in this case, both “minor offences” and criminal proceedings were instituted against
the complainant’s husband.
139. Croatia, App. No. 55164/08 ¶¶ 101–103.
140. Rumor v. Italy, App. No. 72964/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 76–77 (2014).
141. Id. ¶ 61 (f inding that underlying violence constituted a violation of Article 3 of
the Convention).
142. Id. ¶¶ 64–65, 76.
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lived), and her claims that the authorities’ responses failed to give
her adequate notice.143 Once the Court concluded that the State’s
response was adequate, it summarily determined that there was no
violation of Article 14’s anti-discrimination mandate.144
2. Other Claims
A number of decisions by the European Court of Human Rights
in cases alleging states’ failed responses to gender violence reflect an
understanding of the workings of gender bias, even when the com-
plaints were not framed as anti-discrimination claims. For example,
in B.V. v. Belgium, a woman alleged various violations of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights based on the Belgian authori-
ties’ failed responses to her complaints of sexual assault.145 She had
been raped and sexually assaulted by a co-worker and had sought
intervention from the Brussels police.146 The police conducted various
interviews but ultimately took no action and discontinued the inves-
tigation, although they did not inform her about that decision.147 After
learning that no action was to be taken on her complaint, she asked
the prosecutor’s office to reopen the case and then filed a formal com-
plaint.148 She lodged continued complaints over the next nine years
during which various interviews were conducted, but no action was
taken, and the case was dismissed based on insufficient evidence.149
The petitioner claimed violations of Article 3 (prohibition of
inhuman and degrading treatment), Article 6, Section 1 (right to a
fair hearing within a reasonable time), and Article 13 (right to an
effective remedy).150 The European Court of Human Rights concluded,
without searching analysis, that her allegations of rape could be
regarded as complaints of inhuman and degrading treatment and
therefore required authorities to carry out an effective investiga-
tion.151 The Court took a close look at the way her complaints were
handled; for example, it observed that the only action taken after her
143. Id. ¶¶ 67–75.
144. Id. ¶ 77.
145. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, ECHR 145, The Belgian author-
ities did not take the necessary steps to establish the circumstances surrounding alleged
acts of rape and indecent assault (Feb. 5, 2017) [hereinafter B.V. Press Release], avail-
able at https://legalnews.be/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Judgment-B.V.-v.-Belgium-inves
tigation-into-allegation-of-rape-and-indecent-assault.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N3S-TP6Q].
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. B.V. Press Release, supra note 145.
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initial complaint was filed in 1998 was a single interview, and that
all the other interviews were carried out later after the petitioner’s
repeated complaints.152 It concluded that the investigation was un-
dertaken “without any indication of a coherent investigative plan,” and
therefore, could not be said to have been “serious and thorough.”153
Accordingly, the State violated the Convention’s prohibition of in-
human and degrading treatment.154 Even though the case was not
framed as violating an anti-discrimination mandate, its close and criti-
cal evaluation of the State’s responses implicitly reflected an under-
standing of the historic ways in which complaints of sexual assault
have, historically, not been thoroughly and promptly investigated.
Similarly, in Valiuliené v. Lithuania, the European Court of
Human Rights analyzed the applicant’s claims of the State’s failed
responses after a history of repeated physical violence, requests for
medical and legal interventions, and law enforcement authorities’
repeated decisions to discontinue investigations and prosecutions.155
As just one example, in 2005, a prosecutor discontinued the pretrial
investigation notwithstanding the conclusion that Valiuliené had
been strangled, hit, and kicked on five separate occasions in a
period of approximately one month and that her partner was sus-
pected of having perpetrated the criminal acts.156 The prosecutor
determined that under the prevailing law at the time of the assaults,
the prosecution should have been brought by the victim in her pri-
vate capacity and that the crimes were not justiciable because they
were not of “public importance.”157 Her subsequent appeals, some of
which were successful, were ultimately dismissed based on the con-
clusion that they were time-barred.158
Valiuliené claimed that the State had failed to investigate the
repeated acts of domestic violence, had failed to hold the perpetrator
accountable, and that the criminal proceedings against him had been
excessively lengthy.159 The Court reviewed the State’s response closely
and critically, and determined that once the case was transferred for
public prosecution, the investigation was twice suspended for lack
of evidence notwithstanding the petitioner’s serious attempts to
advance the prosecution.160 It noted the prosecutors’ judgment that
the investigations were not sufficiently thorough and concluded that
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Valiuliené v. Lithuania, App. No. 33234/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 44–53 (2013).
156. Id. ¶ 21.
157. Id.
158. Id. ¶ 32.
159. Id. ¶ 42.
160. Id. ¶ 82.
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the failure to prosecute was “a serious flaw.”161 Further, it observed
that her subsequent attempts to have her abuser prosecuted all
proved futile, notwithstanding her persistent efforts.162 The Court
concluded that the State’s responses did not provide “adequate pro-
tection” and therefore violated the Conventions prohibition under
Article 3’s prohibition of “torture” or “inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.”163 Given that conclusion, it found it unnecessary
to examine allegations that the State also violated Article 8’s promise
of respect for private life.164
Another decision similarly reflects the European Court of
Human Rights’ close scrutiny of how law enforcement handles cases
involving allegations of gender violence and similar offenses, even
when those claims are not framed as cases of discrimination. In L.E.
v. Greece, the Court considered claims that forced trafficking vio-
lated the European Convention Article 4’s prohibition of slavery and
forced labor.165 The Court concluded that the nine-month delay
between the time when the petitioner was formally classified as a
victim of trafficking and when the statement went into her file was
not reasonable; the lack of follow up with respect to witness state-
ments, other procedural failings, and unexplained periods of inactiv-
ity led to the conclusion that Greece had violated the Convention’s
prohibition of slavery and forced labour.166
B. CEDAW Domestic Violence Decisions
1. Law Enforcement Responses and Discrimination
The CEDAW Committee also has considered claims of discrimi-
nation in similar cases alleging failed and discriminatory responses
by the authorities to claims of gender violence. A number of these
decisions reflect a nuanced understanding of the ways gender ste-
reotypes manifest. For example, in V.K. v. Bulgaria, a woman sought
a protection order after she sought shelter and left her abusive
161. Valiuliené, App. No. 33234/07 ¶ 82.
162. Id. ¶ 84.
163. Id. ¶ 86.
164. Id. ¶ 87.
165. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, ECHR 28, Criminal complaint
by a victim of human trafficking was not dealt with by the Greek authorities in a way
compatible with the Convention (Jan. 21, 2016), available at https://ec.europa.eu/anti
-trafficking/sites/antitraff icking/files/judgment_l.e._v._greece_-_criminal_complaint_by
_a_victim_of_human_traff icking.pdf [https://perma.cc/NXH8-CENJ].
166. Id. The Court also found violations of Article 6, § 1 and Article 13, guaranteeing,
respectively, the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time and the right to an
effective remedy).
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husband.167 He had prohibited her from working, controlled the
family income and spending, and allowed her money only for the
family’s basic needs.168 His physical and economic abuse escalated
when she defied his instructions, and she left her husband after he
refused to provide financial support.169 Moreover, she suffered beat-
ings which required her to seek medical care.170 Following that
decision, she went to the family home to collect her and her children’s
belongings, but he had come home early from work and started a
dispute and locked the children in the apartment.171 The petitioner
called the police, and she managed to take her daughter, but her son
remained locked in the apartment, and the father refused to let the
petitioner see him.172 The petitioner eventually retrieved her son
and fled from Poland to Bulgaria to seek protection, where she
sought a protection order.173 The court rejected her application based
on its interpretation of Bulgaria’s Law on Protection against Domes-
tic Violence, requiring that the request must be submitted within
one month from the last date of abuse; here, no act of abuse had
been committed during that period.174 It also found “no immediate
danger” to the applicant or her children’s lives and healths.175 The
applicant’s appeal was subsequently denied.176 The husband filed
divorce proceedings and continued to see the children and filed a
civil claim for property to be divided before the divorce proceedings
had completed.177
The Committee read CEDAW’s anti-discrimination mandate
broadly and found that the lower court violated the petitioner’s
rights by applying an “overly restrictive” definition of domestic
violence, which was not warranted by Bulgaria’s law and which was
inconsistent with the State’s obligations under CEDAW.178 The
Committee took the lower court to task for focusing on whether the
allegations constituted “direct and immediate” threats while ignor-
ing her emotional and psychological suffering and for failing to take
into account the past history of abuse.179 The Committee concluded
167. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, V.K. v. Bulgaria,
Comm. No. 20/2008, ¶¶ 2.11, 2.15, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008 (2011).
168. Id. ¶ 2.2.
169. Id. ¶¶ 2.5–2.11.
170. Id.
171. Id. ¶ 2.11.
172. Id.
173. V.K., Comm. No. 20/2008 ¶¶ 2.13–2.15.
174. Id. ¶ 2.18.
175. Id.
176. Id. ¶ 2.20.
177. Id. ¶ 2.21.
178. Id. ¶ 9.9.
179. V.K., Comm. No. 20/2008 ¶9.9.
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that the court’s requirement that abuse be proved “beyond reason-
able doubt” was unduly high and inconsistent with CEDAW, as well
as with modern anti-discrimination standards for civil domestic
violence proceedings.180
The Committee specifically addressed the way traditional
gender-based stereotypes and attitudes regarding women as subor-
dinate to men contribute to domestic violence.181 It reasoned that a
state’s obligation to “banish gender stereotypes” should be consid-
ered in evaluating judicial handling of the case.182 Accordingly, it
found the local court’s decision to deny the protective order “lacks
gender sensitivity” and “reflects the preconceived notion that domes-
tic violence is to a large extent a private matter falling within the
private sphere” which should not be subject to state control.183 The
court’s focus on physical violence and on immediate threats, reflected
a “stereotyped and overly narrow concept” of abuse.184 Similarly, the
Committee critiqued the lower court for finding petitioner’s com-
plaint deficient for failing to make clear exactly how she was struck.185
It also found evidence of “[t]raditional stereotypes of women” in the
divorce judgment, which referred to her use of “insolent language”
with regard to her husband and ordered her to assume her maiden
name after the marriage was dissolved.186 The Committee concluded
that the court’s refusal to issue a permanent protection order was
“based on stereotyped, preconceived and thus discriminatory notions
of what constitutes domestic violence.”187 It found further violation
of the State’s obligation to provide for “immediate protection of women
from violence” based on the unavailability of shelters.188
The CEDAW Committee similarly took historic stereotypes and
biases into account in finding that Bulgaria violated its obligations
to take appropriate measures and provide redress for all forms of
discrimination, including gender violence, in Jallow v. Bulgaria.189
There, Jallow had endured a long history of abuse by her husband;
though her husband first filed a complaint against her with the help
of local child protective services, sought and obtained an emergency
180. Id.
181. Id. ¶ 9.11.
182. Id.
183. Id. ¶ 9.12.
184. Id.
185. V.K., Comm. No. 20/2008 ¶ 9.12
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. ¶ 9.13.
189. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Jallow v. Bulgaria,
Comm. No. 32/2011, ¶¶ 8.4, 8.6, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011 (2012).
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protective order against her, and initiated a divorce proceedings
against her.190 She agreed to the divorce and accepted all of the
conditions as the only way to regain custody of her daughter.191
The Committee’s decision reflected its nuanced understanding
of gender bias. For example, it noted that on one occasion, when
police were called by the social workers who responded to the hus-
band’s request for intervention to persuade his wife to stop breast-
feeding, they focused on the husband’s pornography rather than
responding to Jallow’s concerns about his violence.192 The Commit-
tee concluded that the authorities’ failure to investigate the allega-
tions of the husband’s abuse of Jallow and her daughter violated the
Convention.193 Moreover, the Committee found further violation
based on the fact that the Regional Court granted the husband’s
request for a protective order, did not consider Jallow’s reports of his
abuse, and failed to explain its refusal to remove the protection
order against her even after the Regional Court had dismissed his
application for a permanent protection order.194 The Committee
specifically concluded that the authorities based their responses on
“a stereotyped notion that the husband was superior and that his
opinions should be taken seriously, disregarding the fact that do-
mestic violence proportionally affects women considerably more than
men.”195 It concluded that Jallow and her daughter were “victims of
gender-based discrimination” based on the State’s failure to protect
Jallow’s “equal rights in marriage and as a parent,” particularly given
that she was separated from her daughter based on the emergency
protection order granted against her without due consideration of
her allegations of abuse.196 Notably, the Committee explicitly recog-
nized the role of intersecting forms of discrimination, acknowledging
that the applicant’s vulnerable position as an “illiterate migrant
woman” who did not speak the local language in its reasoning.197
2. Custody, Domestic Violence, and Gender Discrimination
In at least one case involving custody decisions where the re-
lationship was marked by abuse, the CEDAW Committee closely
analyzed the particular facts of the case and concluded that states
190. Id. ¶¶ 2.2–2.16.
191. Id. ¶ 2.15.
192. Id. ¶ 8.4.
193. Id.
194. Id. ¶ 8.5.
195. Jallow, Comm. No. 32/2011 ¶ 8.6.
196. Id.
197. Id. ¶¶ 8.2, 8.5.
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are obligated to advance substantive, not just formal equality. For
example, in Gonzales-Carreño v. Spain, the Committee considered
a custody case in which there was a history of domestic violence.198
The parents had separated, and there was a long history of failed
state response, including failure to enforce the husband’s obligation
to pay child support, a three-year wait for a court to hold a hearing
about her request to use the marital dwelling, over thirty criminal
complaints of threats, abuse and violence filed by the petitioner,
only one of which led to a misdemeanor conviction with a nominal
fine, and an order allowing unsupervised visitation between the
child and her father.199 After one such unsupervised visit, the father
apparently shot their daughter and then committed suicide.200
The Committee recognized the insidious nature of gender
stereotypes in ruling that the State had violated the Convention. It
recognized that the judicial authorities, social services, and the psy-
chological experts were focused on “normalizing relations” between
father and daughter, despite the reservations both social services
and psychological experts had expressed about the father.201 It
acknowledged that the authorities’ focus on normalizing relations
“reflect[s] . . . stereotyped conception[s] of visiting rights based on
formal equality,” which gave advantages to the father despite his
abusive conduct and minimized the positions of the mother and
daughter as victims of domestic violence.202 The Committee recog-
nized that by allowing unsupervised visits without the necessary
safeguards, the State applied “stereotyped and therefore discrimina-
tory notions in a context of domestic violence” and therefore violated
CEDAW.203 It noted the broad range of responses the State had
adopted to address domestic violence, which included legislation,
awareness-raising and capacity building.204 However, it concluded
that in order for domestic violence victims “to see the practical realiza-
tion of the principle of non-discrimination and substantive equality
and enjoy [their] human rights and fundamental freedoms,” public
officials must respect the state’s due diligence obligations, which it
determined was not done in this case.205
198. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Gonzalez-Carreño
v. Spain, Comm. No. 47/2012, ¶ 2.1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012 (2012).
199. Id. ¶¶ 2.5–2.7.
200. Id. ¶ 2.17.
201. Id. ¶ 9.4.
202. Id.
203. Id. ¶ 9.7 (noting violations of Articles 2(a), (d)–(f), 5(a), and 16, as well as para-
graph 1(d) of the Convention).
204. Gonzalez-Carreño, Comm. No. 47/2012 ¶ 9.9.
205. Id.
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C. Gender Identity, Gender Violence, and Discrimination
A few decisions from the European Court of Human Rights
construe the European Convention’s anti-discrimination mandate
broadly to encompass claims of failed responses to homophobic vio-
lence. In M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, petitioners were attacked after
participating in Bucharest’s annual gay pride march.206 They brought
claims alleging that law enforcement’s slow and ineffective response
violated Article 3 (prohibiting torture), Article 8 (right to respect for
private and family life), and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimina-
tion), as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 (which generally prohib-
its discrimination).207 The Court concluded that the authorities’
“duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence” by private individuals
and to investigate potential discriminatory motives can fall under
the obligations of Article 3 or Article 8, but also form part of authori-
ties’ positive obligations under Article 14 to secure the “fundamental
values protected by Articles 3 and 8 without discrimination.” 208 The
Court reasoned that Romania violated Article 3 and Article 14 be-
cause the police “intentionally protracted the investigations for
homophobic motives.” 209 Thus, the Court construed the European
Convention’s anti-discrimination mandate broadly; the absence of
specific prohibitions based on sexual orientation or gender identity
did not bar the claim.
The Court similarly held states to account in at least two other
decisions (not available in English) in instances of gender violence
committed against LGBTI individuals. In Halat v. Turkey, the Court
found a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture) based on failed
investigation and alleged mistreatment of a trans woman who suf-
fered physical and psychological abuse by a police officer.210 Similarly,
in Zontul v. Greece, the Court found violations of Article 3 (prohibition
of torture) in the case of a Turkish national who was seeking to travel
to Italy with other migrants.211 He was escorted to and detained in
Crete where he was raped by one of the Greek coastguard officials
allegedly because of his sexual orientation.212 Thus, the Convention
206. M.C. & A.C. v. Romania, App. No. 12060/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 7–12 (2016).
207. Id. ¶ 47.
208. Id. ¶ 105.
209. Id. ¶ 126.
210. See Turkey LGBTI Resources, REFUGEE LEGAL AID INFO. FOR LAWYERS REPRE-
SENTING REFUGEES GLOBALLY, RIGHTS IN EXILE PROGRAMME, http://www.refugeelegalaid
information.org/turkey-LGBTI-resources [https://perma.cc/H86Z-3V8Y] (citing Halat v.
Turkey, App. No. 23607/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).
211. See Necati Zontul v. Greece, REDRESS, http://www.redress.org/case-docket/necati
-zontul-v-greece [https://perma.cc/4SVX-FE75].
212. See id.; see also Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, ECHR 017,
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held states to account for responding to gender violence against
LGBTI people, even absent specific anti-discrimination provisions.
IV. APPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS IN A TIME OF BACKLASH
This growing body of case law illustrates the promise of interna-
tional human rights instruments that explicitly condemn and call
for remedies to account for individual and institutional gender
biases. Decisions under both the European Convention and CEDAW
offer valuable examples of how adjudicators can closely review the
responses of institutional actors, such as law enforcement and crimi-
nal justice officials, to identify and critique manifestations of gender
bias. No doubt, CEDAW’s language requiring sanctioning of all
forms of gender bias and explicitly naming the role of historic ste-
reotypes and biases, supports those laudable results. It provides a
foundation for future decisions to similarly take a close look at
factual records to determine whether state responses reflect insidi-
ous, unintentional and systemic, bias. The Istanbul Convention,
which has begun to be referenced by the European Court of Human
Rights when interpreting the European Convention, holds similar
potential to guide interpretation in cases involving intimate partner
and sexual violence.
Ironically, the gender-specific language of CEDAW and the
Istanbul Convention could prove to limit those instruments’ reach.
Even though both of those instruments explicitly acknowledge the
role of intersectional discrimination, and even though the Istanbul
Convention explicitly prohibits discrimination based, inter alia, on
sex, sexual orientation and gender identity, both are framed pri-
marily in terms of eliminating discrimination against “women,” 213
which could be interpreted to exclude claims of gender violence or
of institutional responses to gender violence committed against men,
particularly gay or trans men, in ways that perpetuate and com-
pound gender bias. Notably, a number of domestic violence cases
interpreting the European Convention have held states to account
after finding that officials discriminated against a complainant “as
a woman.” 214 This framing raises questions regarding whether the
Court might similarly find discrimination if a gay or trans man
European Court f inds an illegal migrant was tortured by one of the Greek coastguard
officers supervising him (Jan. 17, 2012).
213. Istanbul Convention, supra note 32, at 1–2, 4.3; see also CEDAW Gen. Rec. 19,
supra note 26.
214. See, e.g., Talpis Press Release, supra note 78; Eremia v. Moldova, App. No. 3564/11,
Eur. Ct. H.R. § 86 (2013) ¶ 89; Mudric v. Moldova, App. No. 74839/10, Eur. Ct. H.R.
¶¶ 60–64 (2013); T.M. and C.M. v. Moldova, App. No. 26608/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 62–63
(2014).
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claimed that law enforcement officials responded to their calls for
assistance in cases of domestic or sexual violence against them in
ways that reflected gender bias.
Although the number of cases is too small to draw a firm con-
clusion, the European Convention decisions holding states to ac-
count for responses to bias-motivated violence against LGBTI people
are noteworthy.215 Those decisions interpreted the Convention’s
gender-neutral anti-discrimination provision.216 That permissive
language, broadly prohibiting discrimination and identifying prohib-
ited grounds as illustrative rather than exclusive (i.e., by denoting
with the language “such as,” that the enumerated categories were
not an exclusive list), may more readily be construed as prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, than
are instruments prohibiting discrimination against “women.”
Moreover, the protectionist frame that threads throughout inter-
national human rights instruments, commentary and caselaw, may
similarly prove limiting when applied to LGBTI survivors of abuse.217
This frame has been critiqued by feminists as antithetical to long-
standing anti-stereotyping goals.218 That protectionist frame, which
invokes traditional images of passive, cis-female victims, may not be
applied as easily to gender-nonconforming and LGBTI survivors.
In addition, the decisions’ focus on police and law enforcement
accountability may ring hollow for LGBTI survivors globally given
the ways law enforcement resources historically have and continue
to be used against LGBTI and gender nonconforming communi-
ties.219 While LGBTI and all survivors should be assured nondis-
criminatory responses when they seek law enforcement assistance,
to be truly responsive to the harms of gender violence, states should
address underlying conditions that produce biased violence and
inequality, including broadly focused prevention measures, material
resources, and meaningful programs for redress. The firm commit-
ment to equality reflected in CEDAW, the European Convention,
215. See, e.g., supra Section III.C.
216. European Convention, supra note 4, at art. 14 (“The enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”)
217. See supra notes 47–55; see also, e.g., Bãlºan v. Romania, App. No. 49645/09, Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶ 22 (2017); Talpis Press Release, supra note 78; Kilic Press Release, supra note
93; M.G. v. Turkey, App. No. 646/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 2 (2016); Opuz v. Turkey, App. No.
33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 184–92 (2009); Valiuliene v. Lithuania, App. No. 3323/07,
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 73, 84–87 (2013).
218. See, e.g., supra notes 47–49.
219. See, e.g., Goldscheid & Liebowitz, supra note 18, at 311–17 (detailing the risks
of calling for increased state intervention).
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and the Istanbul Convention opens the door to remedial measures
that address the underlying conditions of structural inequality that
drive and fuel gender violence of all sorts.
This time of backlash calls on us to think broadly and boldly
about how different forms of bias and discrimination interact to
produce and reproduce subordination on multiple grounds. The
cases imposing civil liability on states for failed responses to gender
violence offer important examples of how courts can closely read
factual records to identify and sanction the nuanced operation of
abuse. The law can play a valuable role in condemning bias-motivated
violence, but it will have greater power to advance anti-subordination
goals if it is interpreted broadly and across identity categories. For
cases involving violence based on gender, a nuanced understanding
of the multiple and complex ways gender bias operates, including
the ways in which it impacts gender-nonconforming women, men,
and LGBTI people, will best advance those equality grounded goals.

